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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

In addition, because the purpose of the statutes is
the removal of a nuisance that is injurious to the
health, safety and morals of the community these
statutes have been held to be a lawful exercise of
the police power.7 3 Furthermore, the statutes do
not punish for a crime, but provide for a civil
suit in equity to abate a public nuisance.74 Therefore, since no right to a trial by jury existed in
equity prior to the adoption of the United States
Constitution, there is no violation of the constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury, unless the
scope of this right has been enlarged by the state
constitution.7 5 Thus, as long as the normal procedures for suits in equity are followed, no constitutional rights of the defendant are violated.
CoCLUSION

The powers of a court of equity can be used
effectively to eliminate those forms of organized
vice whose existence depends upon the patronage
of the public and the use of a specific piece of real
property. Property owners, whose ignorance might
have saved them from a criminal prosecution, are
quick to take action when an injunction makes
them responsible for the activities of their tenants.
Furthermore, where a statute provides for the
issuance of a closing order or for the removal and
Casa Co.; 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454 (1917); People
v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31 (1916).
73See People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166 Pac.
812 (1917); People v. Smith, 275 Il. 256, 114 N.E. 31
(1916).
7 "....
(T)he remedy in equity is purely preventative. The chancellor does not punish the defendant for
what he has done. This is left to the criminal courts....
The judgement merely deals with the use of the property in question.... The court of chancery will not
restrain personal conduct, but it will restrain the
unlawful use of property." Respass v. Commonwealth,
131 Ky. 807, 115 S.W. 1131, 1132 (1909) (gambling
house).
75 See Afiegler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) and
cases cited in note 66, supra.
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sale of furniture and fixtures, the possibility of a
loss of income is a strong inducement for the
owner to diligently inquire into the motives of a
prospective tenant and to police his premises after
they have been leased. 76 In addition, the operators
of the illegal business, who may have circumvented
the criminal laws, may be either forced to abandon
their base of operations or punished for a violation
of the decree.
The powers of a court of equity to abate gambling and prostitution as public nuisances are
co-extensive with the broad powers of the state
to protect the general welfare of its citizens.
However, some courts refuse equitable relief
where no injury to property is involved because of
the lack of precedent and their desire to preserve
for the defendant the procedural safeguards of
the criminal proccsses. The argument of the lack
of precedent has been shown to be based upon an
erroneous interpretation of early English cases.
The argument that a defendant is entitled to
the benefits of the criminal procedures is based
upon the theory that enjoining a nuisance which
happens to be a crime is the equivalent of punishing for a crime. This theory is at best questionable.
It overlooks the fact that a court of equity, in
issuing an injunction, neither punishes the defendant for his past criminal activities nor infringes
upon the jurisdiction of the criminal courts; it is
only exercising an historical function of restraining
a use of property which is harmful to the public.
The defendant who is enjoined from operating a
brothel or gambling house that corrupts the morals
of the community is not being punished anymore
than one who is enjoined from operating a legitimate business in a manner that interferes with the
use and enjoyment of his neighbor's property.
76 For a report of the success of the Louisiana statute
in suppressing prostitution see DIsTRIcT ATTORNEY,

PARISH OF ORLEANS, SPECIAL REPORT.

(Jan. 15, 1956).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Failure to Exhaust State Remedies Does Not
Bar Appeal to Federal Courts When Due Solely to
Lack of Finances-After two fruitless attacks on a
New York conviction, the defendant applied for a
writ of error corarn nobis with the New York Supreme Court. This was denied without a hearing
and the defendant filed a timely appeal with the
Appellate Division of that court, and petitioned for

leave to appeal informa pauperis.Even though the
defendant's allegation that he had no money with
which to pay required fees was not challenged, the
petition was denied. In addition, the Court of
Appeals, the highest New York state court, had no
jurisdiction to review the denial of a petition to
appeal in farma pauperis. The defendant later applied to the Supreme Court of the United States
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for a writ of certiorari, which was denied, and then
his petition to the United States District Court was
denied on the ground that he had not exhausted
his state remedies. The United States Court of
Appeals reversed the latter and held that appeal
to the federal courts can be made when possible
state remedies are beyond the grasp of a prisoner
because he does not have the finances with which
to pursue them. United States v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662
(2nd Cir. 1957)
The United States Court of Appeals was informed by the appellee that it was the practice of
the Appellate Division to refuse a petition to appeal informa pauperisif it seemed that the appeal
itself was without merit, even though the petitioner was in fact a pauper. Thus, since there was
no challenge to the defendant's allegation that he
was a pauper, the court concluded that the Appellate Division had decided the defendant's case on
its merits, yet expressed its decision by denying the
defendant's petition to appeal in forma pauperis.
Such a decision could not be appealed to the New
York Court of Appeals because the granting of
such a petition was within the discretion of the
Appellate Division. A formal decision on the
merits of the defendant's appeal was not possible
because he could not pay the required fees. The
court looked to section 2254 of 28 U.S.C.A. which
states that relief may be sought in the federal
courts when state remedies have been exhausted or
"there is the existence of circumstances rendering
such processes ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner." The court stated that "section 2254
does not deprive a prisoner of access to the federal
courts where his failure to exhaust state remedies
is due solely to his financial inability to do so."
Although the court had previously held to the contrary, it commented that such a position was probably unconstitutional in the light of recent Supreme
Court decisions.
Due Process not Violated by Failure of Court to
Explain Plea of Guilty to Defendant When He Is

Represented by Counsel-After the defendant was
charged, with assault to commit great bodily harm,
he requested and received court appointed counsel.
The court then granted the defendant's request for
a one week continuance "for the purpose of entering a plea." At the end of that time, the defendant
entered the plea of guilty, and he was subsequently
sentenced for the term prescribed by law. The trial
court record indicates that at no time did the trial
judge explain to the defendant the effect and meaning of his plea of guilty. The California District
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and held
that the defendant's right to due process under
both the California and United States Constitutions was not dcnied since he was adequately represented by counsel and understood the consequences
of his plea of guilty. People v. Martinez, 316 P.2d 14
(1st Dist. Cal. 1957).
The defendant contended that the failure of the
trial judge to explain his plea of guilty was a denial
of due process. This presented a novel question,
and thus the court looked to the specific circumstances of the case. The court considered highly
significant the factor that the defendant was represented by adequate counsel, and that a continuance had been granted for the express purpose of
formulating a plea, which culminated in the plea
of guilty. The court also noted that the defendant
had been tried on three other occasions, and that
this is a proper consideration in ascertaining that
he was aware of the consequences of his guilty plea.
The court concluded that the "facts and circumstances" of the case placed no duty upon the trial
judge to explain the effect and meaning of the plea
of guilty to the defendant, but stated that under
other facts and circumstances such a duty might
exist. The court made no distinction between the
due process requirements of the State of California
and United States Constitutions.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science
Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 668-670).

ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
"OBSCENITY AND THE LAW"'
To the Editor:
In Vol. 48, No. 3, September-October, 1957, of
this Journal, there appeared an article by Henry
H. Foster, Jr., Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh, entitled, "The 'Comstock Load'-Obscenity and the Law;" Foster points out the dilemma besetting the law in its attempt to shield
society from obscenity, i.e., one can go far, even
too far, in thought control and on the other hand,
one must heed the established principle in criminal
law to intercede only with overt conduct.
Whatever the causal connection of obscenity
with criminal conduct may be, the difficulty would
be eased if we basically knew what obscenity is.
Within our society as well as in practically all
civilized nations the moral obligation is felt to protect the growing human plant and sexual immaturity at any age. In this Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3,
1954 and Vol. 47, No. 4, 1956, it was shown that
there is a criterion by which to judge immature sexuality.This criterion was defined according to Freud's
concept of the development of sexuality, published
in 1905. The application of the criterion of pornography was shown and a number of verifiable concrete factors were outlined. The criterion applies
irrespective of the problem whether or not any
causal relation exists between pornography and
otherwise objectionable conduct. My papers were
quoted in the Modern Penal Code, Tentative
Draft No. 6, May 6, 1957 of The American Law
Institute, pp 32 and 43.
Instead of familiarizing themselves with these
facts, jurists, sociologists and others continue doing
learned work which consists in rehashing again and
again what Coke, Hale, Blackstone and other prehistoric and historic authorities have said. "Prehistory" in this field extends to the latest decision of
the Supreme Court of The United States in which
the new adjective, "purient," was added to the venerable array of adjectives used in former centuries
such as "salacious," "lewd," "lurid," etc. (more
adjectives can be found in the articles in "Obscenity and the Arts," Law and ContemporaryProblems,
Vol. XX, No. 4, Autumn, 1955). It is a paradox
worth noting that those who feel professionally

antagonized by obscenity use the same array of
adjectives without substance as do the pornographers themselves.
How long will lawyers go on limiting themselves
to mere historical descriptions of the futile attempts to deal with the real problem!
W. G. EUASBERG
Practicing Psychiatrist,
New York City
To the Editor:
I cannot accept Dr. Eliasberg's anthropomorphic
conception of Freud nor his evangelical certitude
that an esoteric definition of pornography eliminates all of the problems pertaining to obscenity.
From my point of view, which may be blurred,
things are not black or white, but gray. His "criterion" for recognition of an appeal to sexual immaturity seem amorphous and inevitably subjective. I do not regard them as "facts." I agree that
there may be a felt moral obligation "to protect the
growing human plant and sexual immaturity at
any age" but am impertinent enough to ask:
"From what?" I also suspect that if Dr. Eliasberg
gave a careful look he might find a sadistic element
back of the "moral obligation."
It is true that the drafters of the Model Penal
Code cite one of Dr. Eliasberg's articles along with
others by Karpman and Mead. But after citing
different definitions of obscenity, the following conclusion is reached: "However, although psychiatry
in general gives insight into the significance of obscenity, the legal definition of obscenity cannot
incorporate any specific psychiatric formulation,
first, because there is no psychiatric concensus, and
second because the legal test must be one reasonably
within the power of ordinary citizens to understand,
and of policemen and courts to apply" (emphasis
supplied). Thus, after mature deliberation, the
drafters rejected Dr. Eliasberg's magic formula due
to the disagreement among experts and because it
was believed unworkable.
In answer to the query "How long will lawyers
go on limiting themselves to mere historical descriptions of the futile attempts to deal with the
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real problem," all I can say is, I hope only so long
as we are forced to do so due to the lack of cogent
sociological and psychological data. There is a
great need for a thorough and scholarly study of
the causai relation, if any, between so-called obscenity and misconduct. That is the problem which
many of us feel should be explored by our psychiatrist friends such as Dr. Eliasberg. We await
their findings, and until they are received, I suspect
we'll go along with our own inadequate definitions
and continue our historical and sometimes analytical studies.
HENRY H. FOSTER, JR.
Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
International Congress on Social Defence-The
Fifth International Congress on Social Defence
will be held in Stockholm, August 25-30, 1958.
The Fourth Congress was held at Milan in 1956.
At that time the International Society for Social
Defence received an invitation from the Swedish
Minister of Justice to arrange to hold its Fifth
Congress in 1958 in Stockholm. The council of the
society has chosen as its subject: "Intervention,
by the courts or by other authorities, in the case of
socially maladjusted children and juveniles."
In choosing this topic for discussion, the Society
is continuing the studies entered upon at the
Fourth Congress. During the first three congresses
the general principles of social defence were discussed, and the outcome of this was the adoption
of a basic programme. At the fourth congress a
study of more specific issues was initiated and the
principles of social defence, that the Society intends to uphold, were applied to definite situations
and practical problems.
The topic chosen is undoubtedly one of very
great importance both from a practical and a theoretical point of view. In nearly all countries the
problems concerning juvenile delinquency are becoming steadily more acute. At their First Congress
in Geneva in 1955 to discuss the prevention of
crime and the treatment of offenders, the United
Nations very properly included on their agenda a
debate upon the prevention of juvenile delinquency. However, since the discussions in Geneva
had to be kept within certain limits, the question
as to the measures to be taken when an asocial act
has been committed had to be postponed. Hence it
seems appropriate that an international congress
should now study this problem.

The vital importance of these issues has
prompted the choice of a topic for the Fifth International Congress on Social Defence, which provides opportunities to exchange opinions upon the
manner in which public authorities should intervene when the behaviour of a minor calls for their
intervention.
In formulating the topic, the council has avoided
limiting it to the cases where a minor has committed an offence or an act which would have been
regarded as an offence if it has been committed by
an adult. As the following comments will make
clear, one issue to be studied is, in fact, whether it
is desirable and, if so, to what extent, to restrict
the interference of the authorities to cases of misbehaviour of this nature, with regard to persons
under a certain age.
The topic chosen for the congress involves a
whole series of problems; since, however, it is necessary that the congress should be able to reach
conclusions within the limited time that will be at
its disposal, the following three aspects of the subject have been singled out for particular attention.
1. STAGES IN

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF

SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED MINORS

It seems suitable to discuss first of all the extent
to which special provisions should be made regarding minors when a system of social protection is
being drawn up.
It is necessary to examine whether it is desirable
to lay down an age limit below which young children should be free from intervention by public
authorities. Furthermore the discussion should
take up the question of an upper age limit above
which the special measures for young persons
should not be applicable, and of an age limit for
the imposition of penalties or other measures
proper to the ordinary administration of justice.
It follows that the concept of criminal responsibility must be discussed. There is a tendency at
the present day to do away with the concept of
discernment in favour of a classification by age
groups referring to the need of measures for rehabilitation and reassessment. This attitude gives
rise to the question whether it is not convenient to
examine separately for each measure its appropriate application. The consequences of this view
for the concept of criminal responsibility should be
considered. The question arises whether the concept of a legal age of majority in criminal matters
ought to be maintained.

